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ABSTRACT 
 
The present study investigated how Chinese and western people would response to 
hypothetical and real-life moral dilemmas with different consequences and numbers of 
victims when the one they care about is involved. We used online surveys to collect 
responses from both Chinese and western participants, and explored the threshold of 
how many strangers (or their benefits, depending on the scenarios) people are willing 
to sacrifice for the benefit of their loved ones. We concluded that people are willing to 
sacrifice more strangers (or their properties) to save the life (or the properties) of the 
one they care about, comparing to the amount of strangers they are willing to leave 
emotionally distressed to make the one they care about avoid being distressed. Chinese 
participants have higher thresholds than western participants in such situations, and we 
identified 4 major moral principles behind people’s moral dilemma decisions. 
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 1 Introduction 
The daughter of electronic repair shop owner Daisuke Endo was critically 
ill and in need of a heart transplant. However, she happened to possess a rare 
blood type which made it very difficult to find a heart donor. One day his 
lifelong friend Tateno, a local policeman, went out on a mission to protect a 
girl called Hitomi, who was scheduled to hand her sister’s ransom to a 
kidnapping gang. It looked like a normal mission for a well-established 
detective, but there was only one problem: Hitomi was known to share the 
same blood type with Endo’s daughter. After the ransom handoff, Tateno’s 
colleagues pursued the suspect, leaving him alone with the innocent girl, 
Hitomi. Realizing it was probably the only chance to save his friend’s daughter 
whom he considered as dear as his own, Tateno slowly raised his gun… 
This is the beginning of a famous mystery novel “428: Shibuya Scramble”. 
Tateno was facing a painful moral dilemma: to protect this innocent girl, or to 
kill her and save his friend’s daughter whom he considered his own daughter.  
One of the most best-known moral dilemmas is the so-called “trolley car 
problem”. The original depiction was that there were 5 people tied on a trolley 
car track and a car was about to run over them. Near the track there was a lever 
which can be used to direct the car to a side track so the 5 people would be 
saved. However, another person was tied on the side track so if the lever was 
pulled he would be run over instead. A multitude of variations have been 
proposed since, and a popular explanation put forward in resolving such moral 
dilemmas is utilitarianism, which emphasizes the maximum benefits of a 
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behavior without considering deontological considerations and other 
restrictions, as long as the most benefit can be obtained for the most people in 
the end (Cao, et. al, 2017 ). 
However, in real life situations, such thinking may not always work out, as 
the assumption “without considering other restrictions” is not readily satisfied 
in various contexts. What’s more, there is experimental evidence that utilitarian 
thinking does not necessarily lead to such behaviors or actions (Tassy, et. al, 
2013; Gold, Coleman, & Pulford, 2014). Particularly, in Tateno’s case, it was 
the relationship between him and one of the potential victims that tipped the 
balance, even apparently abandoning his duty as a detective.  
Tateno’s story leads us to the intriguing question: how would people 
behave in real-life moral dilemmas when people they care about are involved? 
In past research about moral dilemmas, the potential “victims” are usually 
anonymous and unknown to the individual making the decision. From the 
perspective of experimental design, the use of anonymous characters serves to 
control potential confounds, and it also creates a perfect setting where no other 
restrictions are included. However, when the personal relationship between the 
decision-maker and the potential victim is taken into consideration, as we’ve 
seen in Tateno’s case, people’s behavior can be drastically affected, even to the 
point where it violates their other moral principles. We’ve seen parents that are 
willing to “sacrifice anything” to protect benefits to their children, even if that 
means they would have to go out of their way to hurt, even kill somebody else. 
(A less extreme example might be the current scandal surrounding college 
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admission bribery at select universities.) Would people’s desire to save their 
loved ones outweigh a traditional utilitarian calculus? What if the potential 
sacrifice is even bigger than 5 other people? In our current study, we varied the 
number of strangers that would potentially suffer in the trolley car dilemma, 
from 1 to 1000, to see how far people are willing to go for the benefit of their 
loved one.  
In real life situations, moral dilemmas may appear in a wide range of 
contexts, with various things at stake. Although they could involve a life-
threatening situation, more often they would involve some less extreme kinds 
of losses such as financial loss or emotional distress. Gold, Pulford and 
Coleman (2013) designed an experiment to compare people’s choices on moral 
dilemma questions involving death, job loss, financial loss and emotional stress. 
They found that people believed it more acceptable to apply the utilitarian 
principle in job loss and financial loss situations than in emotional distress 
situations, but, rather surprisingly, not significantly different from death 
situation. However, we haven’t found any previous studies that have explicitly 
explored how people would respond to real-life moral dilemmas when close 
relationships were involved. The present research was designed to fill this void. 
An additional goal of the present research was to examine the potential 
cultural differences between western and eastern participants in moral dilemma 
responses. Several previous works had noticed cultural differences when it 
comes to moral decisions (Miller & Bresoff, 1998; O’Neill & Petrinovich, 
1998). More specifically, a cross-cultural study by Gold, Colman and Pulford 
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(2014) compared British and Chinese participants’ behaviors and judgments on 
moral dilemmas, which also included non-death real-life situations. Their 
findings suggest that Chinese participants are less willing to sacrifice one to 
save five. However, their findings also suggested that the result could possibly 
be due to Chinese people possessing a stronger tendency to “not intervene” 
rather than any deontological principle. In the current study, we constructed 
real-life scenarios in which a clear decision has to be made to decide who (or 
whose benefit) will be preferenced, in an effort to eliminate people’s notion of 
“not doing anything”.  
 
2 Methods and Design 
  
Participants. Participants were voluntary respondents to an online 
survey. Western participants were recruited from online MTurk survey, Eastern 
participants were recruited at Peking University in China. 
 
Design and materials.  We used a mixed design. Each subject was asked to 
judge 12 scenarios in a 3(Scenarios: trolley vs. emotional distress vs. financial 
loss) * 4(Number of strangers, 1 vs. 10 vs. 100 vs. 1000) within-subjects design, 
and the two cultural differences (western vs. eastern) is a between-subject 
factor.  
The participants were asked to complete a survey containing 3 sets of 
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moral dilemma questions on a Qualtrics survey platform (a Chinese translated 
version of this survey was distributed to Chinese participants), each set consists 
of 4 questions that varies in how many strangers were involved in the dilemma.   
The Trolley car scenario: 
Think about the person you love and care most deeply about. 
Now, imagine that you see a runaway trolley car speeding towards this person, 
who is incapacitated on the tracks. 
You are standing next to a lever which controls the direction in which the trolley 
car is headed. 
On a side track, you see 1/10/100/1000 stranger(s), lying down tied up on the 
tracks. 
If you pull the lever, the train will be redirected to the stranger, saving the person 
you care about, and striking the stranger. 
If you do not pull the lever, however, the stranger will be saved, and the person 
you love will be struck by the trolley. 
The emotional distress and financial loss scenario both featured a situation 
in which the participant had to choose his/her children’s (which was supposed 
to be the equivalent of “someone you care most deeply about, in order to make 
the real-life scenario easier to imagine) interest or some strangers’. 
The emotional stress scenario: 
Suppose you’re driving a van every morning that would take 1/10/100/1000 
adult(s) to their workplace, and your child to school.  
Normally you could make it to both places on time, regardless of the sequence of 
destinations you go to.  
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However, on this particular morning, the traffic is extremely heavy, and you 
estimate that either your child or the 1 adult will be late (depending on which 
destination you go first), and because all of you value being on time, being late would 
cause extreme emotional stress. 
The financial loss scenario: 
Suppose you’re a janitor who is also serving as a security guard in a gym locker 
room.  
During your shift, you see your child putting his smartphone and laptop in a 
locker on the right side of the gym, and 1/10/100/1000 stranger(s) put theirs 
smartphone and laptop in a locker on the left side of the gym. 
As you're cleaning, both lockers start to fall down.  
You can only stop one locker from falling over, but the other locker will collapse, 
thus breaking all the valuable items stored inside. 
Participants response to the question of whether pull the lever or not in the 
trolley car scenario, or whether prioritizing their child’s interest or the strangers’ 
were the dependent measures. Their responses and the time they took were 
recorded through the insertion of timers on each decision.  
The response were recorded as a binary variable indicating “saving the one 
you care for” or “saving the number of strangers”. We hypothesized that 
generally, as the number of strangers increases, people are more likely to 
choose “saving strangers” over “saving the one you care for”, and a “threshold” 
exists for every people in each scenario. For example, if a particular participant 
chose to save the one he cared for against 1- and 10-strangers but otherwise in 
100- and 1000-stranger scenarios in Trolley car situation, his “threshold” in 
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Trolley car situation would be somewhere between 10 and 100 strangers. In 
this sense, the number of strangers also serves as a scale for “how much people 
value the interests (lives/avoiding emotional distress/avoiding financial loss) of 
the one they care about”. 
These response latencies could be used to infer implicit processing that 
might reflect competing values that might be obscured by relying exclusively 
on the final decision as is commonly done in trolley car studies. We hoped that 
this dependent measure would add sensitivity because it is possible that with 
enough time to carefully consider a scenario one’s true feelings may emerge. In 
contrast, with ample time to consider the scenario participants may abandon 
their true desires and respond in a socially acceptable manner. Thus, the timers 
give a measure of how troubling they find the dilemma. 
3 Results 
3.1 Descriptive statistics 
We’ve collected 131 responses from the Chinese data, 17 of which were 
invalid due to either misunderstanding the question or missing data, resulting in 
114 valid data (Male=54, Female=60).  
The western data, collected via MTurk, consisted a total of 58, 9 of which 
were invalid due to failing the attention-checking question, and 2 of the 
remaining had duplicated MTurk ID (A2AJT6HM3UFTFB) but with different 
responses, so we were unable to determine which set of data should be valid, 
thus we considered both sets of data invalid, resulting in 47 valid data 
(Male=30, Female=17). 
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We recorded the response of “aiding the one you care about” as 0, and the 
other option (aiding the strangers) as 1. The overall responses are shown in 
Table 1 below.  
Table1:  Overall counts of responses among all participants 
Scenario Number of 
strangers 
Chinese Western 
Save Love Save Stranger Save Love Save Stranger 
Trolley Car 1 105 9 43 4 
10 66 48 33 14 
100 41 73 26 21 
1000 40 74 26 21 
Emotional 
Distress 
1 54 60 27 20 
10 21 93 13 34 
100 8 106 12 35 
1000 11 103 13 34 
Financial Loss 1 98 16 35 12 
10 66 48 21 26 
100 45 69 21 26 
1000 37 77 20 27 
 
The secondary variable we assessed, the time taken to make the decision, 
was also recorded. However, we noticed there are several long response 
latencies, especially in the first question of each series. From the feedback 
we’ve collected from participants we noticed some of them said that during the 
first question they were still processing the scenario, thus took longer time 
(although in our survey design we did separate the scenario and question in an 
effort to reduce such confound). We intended to limit the participants’ response 
time within 5 seconds, but we would rather have a delayed response than have 
a missing value after 5 seconds expired. In this case, we decided to record the 
responses that took more than 5 seconds as 5 seconds, and the statistics were 
shown in the following table. 
Table 2: Response time (sec) 
8 
 
 
Scenario Number of 
strangers 
Chinese Western 
Mean* SD Mean SD 
Trolley Car 1 5.22(4.32) 2.63(0.97) 4.63(3.81) 2.61(1.10) 
10 3.96(3.38) 2.87(1.36) 4.66(3.74) 3.53(1.27) 
100 3.57(2.83) 4.37(1.47) 4.35(3.46) 4.14(1..41) 
1000 3.08(2.76) 2.71(1.30) 3.77(3.31) 2.43(1.35) 
Emotional 
Distress 
1 4.10(3.34) 3.29(1.28) 5.51(3.83) 6.52(1.05) 
10 2.25(2.24) 1.29(1.28) 3.12(3.01) 1.77(1.49) 
100 1.85(1.85) 1.13(1.12) 2.51(2.48) 1.33(1.28) 
1000 1.84(1.83) 1.14(1.13) 2.82(2.58) 1.94(1.27) 
Financial Loss 1 3.32(3.02) 2.34(1.13) 3.78(3.11) 4.65(1.36) 
10 2.79(2.32) 2.91(1.37) 3.51(2.65) 4.04(1.34) 
100 1.92(1.92) 1.18(1.17) 2.45(2.36) 1.48(1.16) 
1000 1.90(1.90) 1.18(1.17) 2.41(2.20) 2.10(1.16) 
* original stats (adjusted stats) 
3.2 Response 
The response data, due to its binary nature, is then processed in a Wald 
χ2 test to examine the main effects and interactions.  
Table 3: Wald χ2 test of the model 
Factor Wald χ2 df P 
(Intercept) 1.263 1 .261 
Scenario 75.465 2 <.001 
Number 140.771 3 <.001 
Culture 5.187 1 .023 
Scenario * Number 10.383 6 .109 
Scenario * Culture 8.955 2 .011 
Number * Culture 10.279 3 .016 
Scenario * Number * Culture 3.493 6 .745 
The result shows all 3 main effects are significant, and interactions 
between culture and both within-subject factors are significant. The interaction 
between Scenario and Number was not significance, nor was three-way 
interactions. We proceeded to check pairwise comparisons among interactions 
(Bonferroni correction was used in all pairwise comparisons).   
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3.2.1. Overall Scenario 
First we examine the pairwise differences of numbers of strangers 
within each scenario. The overall effect averaged across culture is shown in 
Table 4 below. 
 Table 4: Pairwise comparisons between different numbers of stranger in each 
scenario, averaged across culture.   
Scenario Number difference and p-value 
  Mean 1 10 100 1000 
Trolley 1 .08  <.001 <.001 <.001 
 10 .36 -.28  <.001 .003 
 100 .55 -.46 -.19  1.000 
 1000 .55 -.47 -.19 .00  
Emotional 1 .48  <.001 <.001 <.001 
 10 .77 -.30  .517 1.000 
 100 .86 -.39 -.09  1.000 
 1000 .83 -.36 -.06 .03  
Financial 1 .19  <.001 <.001 <.001 
 10 .49 -.30  1.000 .024 
 100 .58 -.39 -.09  1.000 
 1000 .63 -.44 -.14 -.05  
The difference in the table is always “the less stranger group-the more 
stranger group”, bottom-left: mean difference; top-right: p-value. 
The mean values of each group (based on our coding this is essentially the 
ratio of people who chose to help strangers) give us inferences on where do the 
“thresholds” of the participants lie. For example, the mean value of Trolley car-
1000 stranger group is .55, meaning that 45% of the  participants have their 
threshold in such situation as “more than 1000” (willing to sacrifice more than 
1000 to save the one they care for). The difference between each two number 
groups should suggest the proportion of participants who have the threshold 
between those two numbers. 
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People are much more willing to sacrifice 1 stranger (or their benefits) to 
preserve that of someone they care about, comparing to 10 or more strangers. 
The difference between 1- and 10-stranger situations show that there are 
approximately 30 percent of the participants that have their thresholds between 
1 and 10 strangers in each of the three scenarios. Also, there’s no significant 
difference between 100 and 1000 strangers in each of the three scenario groups, 
which means almost nobody has their threshold at 100 and 1000. In addition, 
only in Trolley car scenario there is significant difference between 10- and 100-
stranger situations. Such results will provide important implication on the 
position of thresholds in each different context. 
3.2.2. Overall Number of strangers 
Similarly we examine the pairwise differences of scenarios within each 
number group. The overall effect averaged across culture is shown in Table 5 
below. 
Table 5: Pairwise comparisons between different scenarios in each number, averaged 
across culture. 
Number  Scenario difference 
  Mean Trolley Emotional Financial 
1 Trolley .08  <.001 .445 
 Emotional .48 -.39  <.001 
 Financial .19 -.11 .28  
10 Trolley .36  <.001 1.000 
 Emotional .77 -.42  <.001 
 Financial .49 -.13 .29  
100 Trolley .55  <.001 1.000 
 Emotional .86 -.32  <.001 
 Financial .58 -.03 .28  
1000 Trolley .55  <.001 1.000 
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 Emotional .83 -.28  .002 
 Financial .63 -.08 .21  
The difference in the table is always “the less stranger group-the more 
stranger group”, bottom-left: mean difference; top-right: p-value. 
The 1-stranger scenario can be considered as a “baseline point”, as there is 
no difference in number of people involved on both sides, which is the 
traditional utilitarian criterion. At this point, we noticed significant higher 
baseline between Emotional distress and other two scenarios, and such pattern 
remains at each level of number. A little bit surprisingly, no significant 
difference was found at any single level of number between Trolley car and 
Financial loss scenarios. 
3.2.3. Cultural difference 
Because of the significant interaction, we examine the difference in 
conditional effects when culture group is held constant.  
Table 6: Pairwise comparisons between different numbers of stranger in each 
scenario, split by culture 
Scenario Number difference (p-value)  
  1 10 100 1000 
Trolley 1  -.21(1.000) -.36(.003) -.36(.003) 
 10 -.34(<.001)  -.15(1.000) -.15(1.000) 
 100 -.56(<.001) -.22(<.001)  .00(1.000) 
 1000 -.57(<.001) -.23(<.001) .00(1.000)  
Emotional 1  -.30(.046) -.32(.005) -.30(.046) 
 10 -.29(<.001)  -.02(1.000) .00(1.000) 
 100 -.40(<.001) -.11(.112)  .02(1.000) 
 1000 -.38(<.001) -.09(1.000) .03(1.000)  
Financial 1  -.30(.120) -.30(.120) -.32(.054) 
 10 -.28(<.001)  .00(1.000) -.02(1.000) 
 100 -.46(<.001) -.18(<.001)  -.02(1.000) 
 1000 -.54(<.001) -.25(<.001) -.07(1.000)  
The difference in the table is always “the less stranger group-the 
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more stranger group”, bottom-left: Chinese; top-right: Western. 
Among Chinese participants, significant differences between 1-stranger 
and each of the other three number levels are found in all three scenarios. In 
addition, the differences between 10- and 100-strangers in both Trolley car and 
Financial loss scenarios are also significant. 
However, among western participants the trends are different. No 
significant difference is detected among 10-, 100- and 1000-stranger groups, 
regardless of scenario. In the Trolley car scenario, significant difference is 
observed between 1- and 100(as well as 1000)- stranger groups; whereas in 
Emotional distress scenario 1-stranger group is significantly different from all 3 
other number levels. No significant difference is detected among western 
participants across 4 number levels in Financial loss scenario. 
3.3 Time 
The time data is examined in a repeated measures test in SPSS. We 
hypothesized that, in each scenario, it would be tougher to make decision when 
the number of strangers are close to the threshold. If the number of strangers 
are far less than the threshold it would be relatively easy to sacrifice those 
strangers, and when the number of strangers increased past the threshold, it 
should be easier to determine that they should save the large number of 
strangers, which means they may take less time to make decisions.  
13 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Mean adjusted time taken to make decision (Left: Chinese, Right: Western) 
Table7: Repeated Measures Test result of Time 
Factor F df p-value Partial η2 
Scenario 95.640 1.943 <.001 .376 
Number 111.814 2.904 <.001 .413 
Scenario * Number 2.278 5.871 .036 .014 
Culture 9.586 1 .002 .057 
Scenario * Culture 4.190 1.943 .017 .026 
Number * Culture 6.553 2.904 <.001 .040 
Scenario * Number * Culture 1.996 5.871 .065 .012 
Note: Huynh-Feldt correction are performed in all within-subject variables due to 
violation of sphericity. 
However, as the graph shows, even after the adjustment for long 
response latencies, the longest response time in each scenario almost always 
occurred in the “1 stranger” case, and the time taken generally decreased with 
larger numbers. Despite this unexpected effect, we were still able to identify 
significant differences between Chinese and western participants (F=9.586, 
p<.01), which showed that Chinese participants took less time on average than 
western participants. We also found a significant interaction between Scenario 
and Number (F=2.278, p<.05, Huynh-Feldt correction). Most notably, we 
found no difference in response time between 100- and 1000-stranger situation 
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in all scenarios, and a significant time decrease from 10 to 100 strangers, 
supporting our inference of thresholds from response data. 
In addition to the overall average pattern we are also interested in how 
each participant’s time taken changes when the number of strangers increases 
in each scenario. The majority of participants took the longest time in the 1-
stranger condition (72.7% in Trolley car, 73.3% in Emotional distress and 59% 
in Financial loss), again in accord with the overall result. However, because of 
the relatively large distance between the options, it’s difficult to observe 
distinct patterns in individual levels, or to examine our hypothesis that the 
longer time would be taken if the number of strangers is closer to the threshold.  
We also conducted more detailed pairwise comparisons like we did in 
the Response part.  
3.3.1. Overall scenario 
In each scenario, The time taken by participants demonstrated a 
decreasing pattern (as shown in Table 8), in which 1-stranger condition took 
the most time, 10-stranger condition took significantly less time, and again less 
time taken when it came to 100 or more strangers. The result suggests that 
people are having a much harder time deciding the fate of less people and, 
according to our hypothesis, indicates more people would have their threshold 
at lower number of strangers (closer to 1-10 strangers instead of 100 or more). 
Table 8: Pairwise comparisons of time between different numbers of stranger 
in each scenario, averaged across culture. 
Scenario Time difference and p-value 
15 
 
 
  Mean 1 10 100 1000 
Trolley 1 4.07  <.001 <.001 <.001 
 10 3.58 .50  .006 <.001 
 100 3.15 .92 .41  1.000 
 1000 3.03 1.03 .53 .11  
Emotional 1 3.59  <.001 <.001 <.001 
 10 2.63 .96  .001 .002 
 100 2.16 1.42 .46  1.000 
 1000 2.21 1.38 .42 -.04  
Financial 1 3.07  <.001 <.001 <.001 
 10 2.49 .58  .042 .005 
 100 2.14 .93 .34  1.000 
 1000 2.05 1.02 .44 .09  
The difference in the table is always “the less stranger group-the more 
stranger group”, bottom-left: mean difference; top-right: p-value. 
3.3.2. Overall number of strangers 
We also compared the time taken in different scenarios within each level 
of number of strangers. We found that people spend more time in Trolley car 
scenario than the two real-life scenarios in each number group. The result 
indicates that people might generally find it tougher if a moral dilemma 
involves lives and deaths than those real-life situations where emotional or 
financial interests are at stake. In most cases there were no significant 
differences between Emotional distress and Financial loss situations (only 
difference was observed in 1-stranger condition). 
Table 9: Pairwise comparisons of time between different numbers of stranger 
in each scenario, averaged across culture. 
Number  Time difference 
  Mean Trolley Emotional Financial 
1 Trolley 4.07  <.001 <.001 
 Emotional 3.59 .48  <.001 
 Financial 3.07 1.00 .52  
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10 Trolley 3.58  <.001 <.001 
 Emotional 2.63 .93  .858 
 Financial 2.49 1.07 .14  
100 Trolley 3.15  <.001 <.001 
 Emotional 2.16 .98  1.000 
 Financial 2.14 1.01 0.2  
1000 Trolley 3.03  <.001 <.001 
 Emotional 2.21 .82  .523 
 Financial 2.05 .98 .16  
The difference in the table is always “the less stranger group-the more 
stranger group”, bottom-left: mean difference; top-right: p-value. 
3.3.3. Cultural comparisons 
 We compared cultural difference of time taken both by scenario (Table 
10) and by number of strangers (Table 11).  
In scenario comparisons Chinese participants made decisions 
significantly faster in Emotional distress scenario (p<.001) and the difference 
in Financial loss scenario reached borderline significance (p=.051). The time 
difference in Trolley car scenario is not significant.  
Table 10: Cross-cultural comparison of Time by Scenario 
Scenario Culture Mean Mean dif. p-value 
Trolley CN 3.323 .256 .130 
 West 3.579   
Emotional CN 2.315 .662 <.001 
 West 2.977   
Financial CN 2.289 .292 .051 
 West 2.581   
 
In number comparisons Chinese participants made decisions 
significantly faster in all but the 1-stranger condition, in which the difference is 
not significant.   
Table 11: Cross-cultural comparison of Time by Number 
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Number Culture Mean Mean dif. p-value 
1 CN 3.561 .024 .870 
 West 3.585   
10 CN 2.648 .482 .005 
 West 3.130   
100 CN 2.199 .571 <001 
 West 2.770   
1000 CN 2.163 .535 <.001 
 West 2.698   
  
However, we are aware that the difference between conditions could be 
confounded by the sequence of presentation. We didn’t randomize the 
sequence of questions; instead every set of question is presented in the order of 
ascending number of strangers. Participants might be setting up their “criteria” 
while answering the first questions, and apply those criteria when answering 
later questions to more efficiently make decisions. It was also possible that they 
were able to anticipate the pattern of questions so they needed less time to 
make decisions when the questionnaire progressed. The cultural differences 
were insignificant in the “first” conditions of both scenario and number, which 
also possibly indicates that those Chinese participants were faster to establish a 
decision-making pattern. 
3.4 Reasoning 
So, what are the rationales behind their decisions, or in other word, how 
do people determine the thresholds? To answer this question, we have to look 
into the write-ups participants had provided, and we roughly divide the 
responses into 3 groups by their threshold: “Altruistic group”, in which they 
chose to help even 1 stranger over the one they care about; “Selfish group”, in 
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which they always chose the one they care about no matter the number of 
strangers, and “Balance group”, in which they initially chose to help their loved 
ones against 1 stranger but changed their minds somewhere in between. The 
prevailing reasons in each group are different. We generalized 4 major 
categories of moral reasoning based on their write-ups: 
(1) Recovery principle. When this principle is applied, people concede a 
loss that they believe can be recovered, or is easier to recover compared with 
the other alternative; 
(2) Responsibility principle. When this principle is applied, people 
choose the action they feel obliged to do, or choose against what they don’t feel 
obliged to do;  
(3) Selfish principle. When this principle is applied, people solely focus 
on the benefit they would get themselves without even considering what loss 
other people might suffer; 
(4) Pseudo-utilitarian principle. When this principle is applied, people 
acknowledge the number of strangers that would be sacrificed is important, and 
believe that when the number of innocent sacrifices is large enough then they 
should offset the personal interest of saving the one they care about. 
Besides the 4 major principles, there are also some other replies that 
didn’t fit into any of them, mostly being too specific and scenario related. For 
example, “I want to make my child know the importance of punctuality (so I 
would drive the adults to work first)”, “It’s hard to punish a lot of people for 
being late at the same time (so I would drive my child to work first)”. Also 
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there were some vague answers which didn’t really explain the reasoning, such 
as “I trust on my instinct”, which were left out in our analysis. 
 In the “Altruistic group”, which is almost exclusively seen in the two 
real-life scenarios, we identified Recovery and Responsibility as 2 major 
rationales that lead to their decisions. Answers like “I can console the child 
who suffers emotional distress”, “I can always buy a new smartphone for my 
child”, or “Being late for school is not as serious as late for work” were coded 
as Recovery principle being applied, since they focused on the ability to 
redeem the loss. Answers like “Sending the adults to work is my duty” were 
categorized as Responsibility principle being applied.  
For the “Selfish” group, most people just simply stated the “selfish” 
principle, especially in the Trolley car scenario. Among the participants’ write-
ups, one Chinese participant quoted the famous sentence in The Tale of Three 
Kingdoms, “I would rather betray everyone than being betrayed by anyone,” to 
describe the reason to sacrifice 1000 strangers to save the one he care about. In 
our scenarios, any reasoning that implicated the significance of close 
relationship is considered “selfish” principle being applied. Other reasons in 
this category include “No reason is needed if it’s for the life of my loved one”, 
“I don’t care about strangers’ benefit”, or “I put my emotions and feelings at 
the highest priority”. Besides, Responsibility rationale is also observed among 
this group. If the participants interpret the situation as they are not responsible 
for the loss of whatever number of strangers’ properties, they don’t feel obliged 
to try to protect it hence justified their decision to protect the properties of the 
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one person they care about. Reasons like “It’s not my fault that the strangers’ 
properties were damaged”, “I’m not responsible for the loss of strangers” 
would fit into this category. 
Finally, for all those in “Balance” group, there were no such clear-cut 
answers. The most general answer was that they “wanted to minimize the total 
loss/maximize the total benefits”, or “the number of strangers matters”, 
somewhat similar to the utilitarian thinking. Reasons that highlighted this line 
of thinking included “I only had to suffer a small loss (financially) to save the 
majority”, “Comparison of the value (of items in jeopardy)”, or “I would 
reconsider if I would have to sacrifice a ‘considerable amount of strangers’ in 
order to save my loved one”. We named it “Pseudo-utilitarian” because it 
resembles the utilitarian idea but doesn’t necessarily assume that all individuals 
are equal. The rule of Recovery can also play a significant role in this group 
under non-lethal scenarios, as some people justified their selfish decision when 
less strangers’ properties were jeopardized, because such loss is easier to 
recover than public loss on a larger scale. This rationale is particularly 
identified in some cases when people chose to sacrifice the interests of 10 
strangers but favored 100 and more strangers, when they believed that it would 
no longer be affordable if the loss is that much. 
We counted how many times people cited the aforementioned principles 
in their responses. In some cases people used multiple principles to explain 
their decision in one single condition, and in such cases they were counted in 
both categories. 
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Table 12: Occurrence of each principles in each condition  
Scenario Reasoning 
  Rec Res Pseudo-Uti Self Other 
Trolley Selfish 0 0 0 45 6 
 Balanced 0 0 71 0 17 
 Altruistic 0 0 0 0 14 
Emotional Selfish 0 0 0 7 2 
 Balanced 19 0 42 0 19 
 Altruistic 35 29 0 0 15 
Financial Selfish 0 32 0 16 3 
 Balanced 6 3 55 0 11 
 Altruistic 9 2 3 0 7 
(Chinese and Western combined.) 
4. Discussion 
We intended to explore how people would response facing hypothetical 
and real-life moral dilemmas when someone they care deeply about (their 
loved ones) is involved. From the responses they made, we are able to infer 
how much do people value their loved ones on the scale of “number of 
strangers” when different contexts are presented, and, along with the reasoning 
they provided in the write-ups, also the moral principles that help them make 
the decisions.  
Overall, people are willing to go further to save the lives of those they 
care about than only to help them avoid emotional distress or financial loss. 45% 
of our participants felt it worth to sacrifice even 1000 innocent lives to save the 
life of one person they care about, while only 23% believed that they should 
help their child avoid extreme emotional distress at the expense of “only” 10 
strangers suffer the same pressure. It’s quite shocking to see that such a large 
proportion of the participants are willing to “kill” thousands of people to save 
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one person they care about.  
When we look at the threshold of how many strangers could outweigh 
the one they care about, apart from those who has the threshold over 1000  and 
under the baseline, the most significant shift in each group are all in 1-10 
strangers. Roughly 30% of participants in each scenario who had prioritized the 
one they care about over 1 stranger changed their mind when the number of 
strangers rose to 10. There were essentially no difference between 100 and 
1000 groups, which indicates that if the sacrifice goes to more than 100, the 
number hardly matters anymore.  
The cultural difference mainly displays itself in the 10-100 strangers 
interval. Western participants showed no significant difference between these 
two groups in all scenarios, while responses from Chinese participants 
significantly differed in both Trolley car and Financial loss scenarios. It means 
there are more Chinese who have their threshold between 10 and100, possibly 
indicating that Chinese are more likely to assign higher value to the interests of 
the one they care about than the western counterparts. 
We also assessed the time taken to answer each question. The no-
difference between 100- and 1000-stranger groups partially supported our 
inference of thresholds from the response data. However, our assumption of the 
time should be longer when the number of strangers are closer to the threshold 
may not hold true. First, there’s significantly longer time taken in 1-stranger 
situation, which is the first question of each scenario. This can be confounded 
by people still digesting the plot of the story (despite we made effort to prevent 
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that from happening), or maybe they are actually establishing a judgment 
criteria for the ongoing scenario during that first question. The consistently 
decreasing pattern in response time could imply that participants in later 
questions had already set up their decision criteria and threshold before they 
enter the choice page, so they might not feel that difficult even if they are 
crossing their threshold. 
To summarize people’s reasoning behind moral decisions, we identified 
4 major moral principles that govern people’s decision in moral dilemmas 
when someone they care about is involved: “Recovery” (whether the 
punishment is redeemable), “Responsibility” (whether they are obliged to do 
one thing over the other, and/or would they be held responsible for whatever 
loss occurs), “Selfish” (bias towards the one they care about no matter what the 
cost and consequences are), and “Pseudo-utilitarian” (maximize the total loss, 
but from a biased personal perspective which assigns extra weigh on the 
interests of the one they care about). Under different circumstances and across 
different threshold groups, people use different principles to make (and justify) 
their decisions, especially in real-life situations where more people are using 
Recovery and Responsibility principles.  
5. Limitations and Future directions 
Because of the lacking of previous research on moral dilemmas with both 
real-life situations and close relationship involved, our current research have 
few examples to follow, which created some obstacles in our experiment 
design.  
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The most significant difficulty we encountered is to invent the real-life 
scenarios. The study of Gold et. al. (2013) invented a “sauna scenario”, in 
which the people in a sauna room could face punishment for them being 
exposed on a public camera. In their material they were able to control all other 
variables except for the would-be punishment. However, their scenarios were 
simulating the bystander and footbridge models of trolley car, which means 
they cannot prevent the option of “not taking action” which we intended to 
eliminate. In addition, we want the punishment in our scenarios more “natural”, 
and we feel that the “sauna scenario”, it is unnatural for the people in the story 
to get punished when the party at fault is actually the sauna house which didn’t 
fix a malfunctioning hidden camera in the sauna house and didn’t inform the 
customers. These are the rationale behind our “drive to work” and “falling 
lockers” stories. However, in our real-life scenarios, we used “your child” as 
“the one you cared deeply about” and “adults” as the strangers, that creates an 
unnecessary discrepancy. Despite we explicitly described the would-be 
punishment in each of the occasions, some people still were inclined to think 
one adult should outweigh one child because of the difference in their social 
status. This is probably the most significant confound in our material and 
should be fixed in our further studies. A potential remedy is to make refinement 
on the “drive to work” story, change the “drive your child to school” into 
“drive your spouse (or other adult that you care deeply about) to work”. Such 
refinement can not only help eliminating the child-adult discrepancy, but also 
adapt well in financial loss (receive cut in salary if late) and some other real-
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life scenarios. 
In our research, the 1 – 1000 scale of number of strangers is exploratory. The 
reason for setting the highest mark at a relatively large (even large enough to 
make the real-life situation unrealistic) number of 1000 is we want to make 
sure that the threshold is reached if there is any.  That is to say, apart from 
those who adopted “Selfish” rationale, all other participants should determine 
that the amount of strangers were too much to sacrifice even for the sake of 
their loved ones. Judging from the result, our intended goal was met, and we 
were able to lower the threshold cap to 100 strangers. But such widespread 
range also came at a cost. We can’t pinpoint the thresholds at a more precise 
level. In future studies, however, we can narrow the range and thus make 
smaller intervals between 1-100 if we intend to investigate more thoroughly. 
We intended to use the timer as a pressure and to mimic real-life situations 
where we really need to respond quickly to such dilemmas. We also recorded 
response time as an extra measure to assess the difficulty for participants to 
make decisions. Such measure didn’t give us a clear and convincing result. The 
two main reasons are potential confound of presenting sequence and the 
intervals. Because of the fixed sequence, participants would find it easier in 
subsequent questions once they anticipated the question patterns, making them 
use less time to reach their decisions. The wide interval of stranger numbers 
also made it hard to draw any correlation to test our hypothesis. Fortunately our 
current results would enable us setting up smaller intervals in the future. 
We identified 4 major principles in people’s moral reasoning with their 
26 
 
 
loved ones involved, but it’s only at a descriptive level now and we haven’t 
formed a statistical model yet. This is a small step towards a domain that is 
rarely touched, and we could try to run a factor analysis if we are going to test 
it. Prior to the experiment we thought that people would always prioritize the 
benefit (or avoid the loss) of the one they care about first, and should show 
reliable preference in 1-on-1 situations, but the Recovery principle in real-life 
situations gives us another perspective. Instead of focusing on preventing the 
loss, Recovery principle focuses on recovering after the loss. It suggests that it 
would be easier to recover the loss of someone we care about than some 
random strangers, so it would also be easier to accept such loss happening to 
someone we knew well, hence they would bias towards the strangers, 
contradicting our predictions. Future studies can put more emphasize on such 
“inverse” trend, to see how it interacts with other major principles like 
Responsibility, and whether it still holds in other real-life settings. 
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